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Abstract 
This paper aims at analyzing the implications of individuals’ consumption jealousy on the 
dynamic structure of a two-sector model economy. We find that status-seeking substantially 
influences both, the long-term properties and the adjustment behavior of the model. 
Depending on the status motive, productivity disturbances might induce countercyclical 
responses of work effort whereas preference shocks are expected to generate an 
overshooting relative capital intensity. Generally we find that, for empirically plausible values 
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, a higher degree of consumption jealousy 
induces agents to devote more time to education which stimulates human capital 
accumulation and hence promotes economic growth. 
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1 Introduction
Time-separable utility representations have a long pedigree in economics and can be found at the
core of most macroeconomic settings in recent work. Typically, an agent’s level of satisfaction is
assumed to depend primarily on individual variables, like current consumption, leisure, or real
money balances. There is, however, persuasive empirical evidence, some of which is provided by
Oswald (1997), Frank (1997) and Fuhrer (2000) indicating that individual utility is to a large
extent determined by comparing current variables like consumption or wealth to some specific
standard, which is usually a given reference stock. This reference stock is typically assumed
to comprise some measure of current and/or past economy-wide average consumption levels,
which makes the utility representation time non-separable. The presence of this comparison
element suggests that individuals derive utility from relative rather than absolute consumption.
Hence, they are concerned with their relative position in society, which is also referred to as
their status. Generally, this type of preferences has been labeled as ”outward-looking” since
agents base their decisions on an external comparison criterion1. The key issue of this paper
addresses the implications of status seeking for the process of economic growth. The goal then,
is to discuss whether - and if yes, to what extent - status, modeled as relative consumption
exhibits a perceivable impact on the model’s equilibrium and transitional dynamics.
The idea that individuals’ choices are to some degree motivated by social rewards (including
status) is in fact not a new one, but can be rather traced back to great thinkers such as Adam
Smith (1776), Thorstein Veblen (1899) and David Hume (1978), among others. Nevertheless, a
formal integration of this concept into economics was not until the work of Duesenberry (1949),
who defined status as the ratio of an individual’s own consumption to average consumption of
the others. Even though, time separability still plays a dominant role in economic modeling,
there have been recent efforts to incorporate comparison utility into dynamic macro-settings.
For instance, in the field of asset pricing this concept has been invoked to explain certain asset
pricing anomalies, such as the well-known equity premium puzzle raised by Mehra and Prescott
(1985). Notable attempts in this regard have been made, for instance, by Constantinides (1990),
Abel (1990) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999)2. Status orientation has also been successfully
adopted to address issues of taxation. Ljungquist and Uhlig (2000) study the implications of
a ”catching up” preference structure on short-run macroeconomic stabilization policies3. Liu
and Turnovsky (2005) study the effects of consumption and production externalities on capital
1”Outward-looking” preferences are frequently referred to as ”Keeping/Catching up with the Joneses”, ”inter-
dependent utility” or ”external habit formation”. There exists an alternative specification, which the literature
has termed ”habit formation”, postulating an internal criterion as a comparison benchmark. In contrast to the
”outward-looking” case, the reference stock here depends on the agent’s own consumption history rather than the
economy’s average.
2Constantinides (1990) employs a model with habit forming agents to address and resolve the premium puzzle,
while Campbell and Cochrane (1999) analyze the effects of consumption externalities, induced by outward-looking
preferences, on asset pricing and equity premiums. Gal´ı (1994) argues that ”keeping up” has the same effect as
increasing the degree of risk aversion. This is due to the fact that consumers with these preferences dislike large
swings in consumption, hence the premium paid for holding risky assets must be high relative to time separable
preferences.
3They find that the optimal tax policy affects the economy countercyclically via procyclical taxes and, hence,
mitigates aggregate demand fluctuations.
1
accumulation and welfare4. Comparison utility need not necessarily be defined over relative
consumption. Various studies in the recent literature argue that it can be rather relative wealth
that determines individuals status seeking. In the spirit of this approach Van Long and Shi-
momura (2004) study the influence of wealth-inequality in a heterogeneous agents framework5.
Recently relative wealth has also been studied by various authors in the context of open econ-
omy settings. Most notably, Fisher (2004) and Fisher and Hof (2005) discuss an open economy
Ramsey model that has been augmented by relative holdings of net foreign assets. They find
that making allowance for status seeking can eliminate some crucial counterfactual properties
of the conventional Ramsey model under time-separable utility6.
As mentioned at the outset, the time non-separable utility representation is strongly supported
by empirical findings. Early studies by van de Stadt et al. (1985) confirm the hypotheses that
an individual’s well-being depends on her relative position in society. Using panel data for the
Netherlands they test for in- and outward-looking elements in individual utility. However, van
de Stadt et al. (1985) cannot reject the existence of absolute and relative components. Fuhrer
(2000) clearly rejects the time separable utility specification. He finds that both current aver-
age consumption and an internal benchmark determine utility, where approximately 80% of the
utility weight should be put on the latter. Moreover, Fuhrer and Klein (1998) argue that for
G7 countries habit formation is a significant characteristic of people’s consumption behavior.
Interestingly, using data on British workers, Clark and Oswald (1996) provide empirical evidence
that the level of individuals’ satisfaction is inversely related to comparison wage rates. Taking
into account that wages, or, more precisely, income, is directly related to the consumption level
of an individual, these results - along with the work carried out by Oswald (1997), Frank (1997)
and Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) - are strongly in line with the theoretical predictions of
the comparison consumption framework. The existing empirical evidence is admittedly sparse,
but it nevertheless provides convincing support for the relevance of comparison elements in de-
termining individual utility.
So far, relatively few papers have focused on the role status might play for economic growth.
Aside from early efforts by Ryder and Heal (1973) who incorporate habit formation into a neo-
classical growth model it was not until the late 1990s that economists started to discuss status
preference in the context of growth settings. Carroll et al. (1997) introduce two types of time
non-separable elements - an internal and an external criterion - in a simple AK-framework and
contrast the respective implications of each element on the model’s transitional dynamics7. A
similar attempt has been made by Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004), who discuss how alterna-
4The consumption externalities in their paper are again due to a preference structure that includes comparison
elements. They derive an optimal tax structure that corrects for the distortions created by these externalities.
5They find that the initially poor might catch up with the rich if the marginal utility of relative wealth exceeds
the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption. However, when people don’t care about their status, then the
inequality will persist in the long run.
6Particularly the fact that an impatient economy - in the sense that the personal discount rate exceeds the
world interest rate - mortgages all its wealth over time. They identified an endogenous effective rate of return that
hinges on both own consumption and the net assets and ensures the existence of a long-run interior equilibrium,
even if the discount rate exceeds the world interest rate.
7Observe that the conventional AK growth model exhibits no transitional dynamics. However, a modified
preference structure that accounts for time non-separability alters this property.
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tive assumptions about preferences affect the process of economic growth. They compare three
different regimes, i.e. time separable, inward- and outward looking preferences and find that
the departure from time-separability substantially alters the dynamic structure of the model.
Incorporating the concept of relative wealth in an endogenous growth setting, Futagami and Shi-
bata (1998) find that if individuals are identical, higher status aspiration leads to higher growth
whereas individuals’ heterogeneity might reduce growth through an induced misallocation of re-
sources. Corneo and Jeanne (1997) assert that status orientation may lead to excessive growth
resulting from an overaccumulation of physical capital, but it can also induce the social optimal
rate of growth if the status aspiration is sufficiently strong. In a subsequent paper Corneo and
Jeanne (2001) find that relative wealth incorporated into a neoclassical growth model - one that
typically exhibits zero steady-state per capita growth - appears to be the engine of positive
equilibrium growth. The vast majority of this work is primarily concerned with preference and
demand-related issues hence the production side is rather oversimplified. But especially when
addressing the dynamic process of economic growth one should be aware that - due to their
one-sector design - AK or neoclassical modeling devices are rather restrictive.
The theoretical framework we employ accounts for the fundamental role human capital plays in
explaining long-term growth of modern economies. Hence, in the spirit of Robert Lucas (1988)
we choose a two sector production specification in which agents are assumed, first, to exhibit a
certain degree of consumption jealousy. In other words, we assume that agents posses prefer-
ences over their relative position in society. Second, individuals allocate their disposable time
across the two production sectors to maximize their utility. This setting explicitly allows us to
address a variety of issues that most of the existing literature fails to explain. For example, we
can investigate the implications of consumers’ status seeking on the intersectoral allocation of
productive resources, i.e. raw time, physical and human capital. Second to study how consump-
tion jealousy affects the model’s transitional and equilibrium dynamics. This includes a careful
discussion about the extent to which varying degrees of envy affect the adjustment behavior
and the equilibrium growth performance. For the purpose of analyzing the dynamics, we con-
sider specific productivity and preference shocks and numerically simulate adjustment paths of
some selected key variables. Finally, we establish necessary and sufficient conditions that ensure
the existence and the uniqueness of an interior equilibrium and show that these depend on the
status-indicating parameters of the model.
Before closing this section we wish to stress some key-results of this analysis. First and foremost,
we find that consumption jealousy substantially alters the dynamic structure of the economy.
Both in the balanced-growth equilibrium and during the transition the envy motive exhibits
a non-negligible impact on the model’s key variables. For the equilibrium growth rate we ob-
tain ambiguous effects of status seeking that mainly depend on the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution. For parameter values that are in close accord with empirical estimates we find
that productivity shocks in the final goods sector might induce (counter-)cyclical behavior of
labor allocation resulting from an interplay of intersectoral reallocation and catching up efforts.
Preference shocks, in contrast, entail a monotonous response of labor but cause an overshooting
long-run capital intensity. This can be traced back to interdependencies of temporary pro-
3
ductivity imbalances across sectors and the average product of physical capital, in response to
that shock. Generally we can state that a higher degree of status seeking tends to increase the
schooling efforts and hence stimulates economic growth. Moreover, there exists a unique interior
balanced growth path equilibrium whose properties depend to a large extent on the parameters
that determine the envy motive.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we lay out the basic structure
of the theoretical model introducing a time non-separable preference representation. Section 3
derives the equilibrium conditions and discusses the necessary and sufficient conditions for exis-
tence and uniqueness of a balanced growth equilibrium. This section also contains a stability and
sensitivity analysis that underlies the local saddle path stability of the model. Section 4 studies
the off-equilibrium dynamics of the economy which is mainly done by numerical simulation.
Section 5 concludes and discusses possible extensions.
2 The Model
2.1 Preferences
As a basic framework we consider a two-sector model economy populated by a continuum [0, 1] of
identical atomistic individuals with unbounded horizon. Let agent i’s utility at each point in time
depend on the comparison of her own consumption, ci(t), to a certain reference stock which in
this model is determined by the average level of consumption in the economy, c˜(t) =
∫ 1
0 ci(t)di.
In particular, preferences of agent i are characterized by a C2 utility function U (ci(t), c˜(t))
satisfying the standard concavity and limiting-behavior properties in c, i.e. Uc (·) > 0, Ucc (·) < 0
and limc→0 Uc (·) = +∞, limc→∞ Uc (·) = 0.
To be more concrete, the functional form of U (ci(t), c˜(t)) in this paper is postulated to be
isoelastic which will allow us to derive explicit results.
U (ci(t), c˜) = (1− σ)−1
(
ci(t)(κ
∫ t
0
e−κ(t−s)c˜(s)ds)−(1−β)
)1−σ
(1)
Each individual discounts the utility of her future consumption at a constant exogenously
given rate ρ ≥ 0 and let σ > 0 denote the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution8.
Furthermore, in accordance with much of the existing literature on status preferences, it is
assumed that individuals, in general, envy their neighbors consumption, hence Uc˜ (·) < 0 and
Ucc˜ (·) > 09. The latter condition implies that an agent values an additional amount of own
consumption more, the higher the average level of consumption in the economy is. The reference
stock, call it x(t), is composed of the weighted sum of current and past average consumption
levels, i.e. x(t) = κ
∫ t
0 e
−κ(t−s)c˜(s)ds where κ ∈ [0,∞) indexes the relative importance of recent
compared to past average consumption. A more intuitive interpretation of κ can be deduced
8Similar versions of (1) have been recently used, for instance by Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004) and Carroll
et al. (1997).
9The case of admiration that is characterized by Uc˜ (·) > 0 is considered by Dupor and Liu (2003) and Liu
and Turnovsky (2005)
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from the dynamic representation of x(t). Using Leibnitz’ rule we get x˙(t) = κ (c˜(t)− x(t))10
from which we can infer that κ drives the speed of adjustment of the reference stock. For high
values of κ adjustment is rather rapid implying that x(t) is close to c˜(t) with limκ→∞ x(t) = c˜(t).
In this case individuals preferences are more presence-orientated. On the other hand, extremely
low values of κ lead to sluggish adjustment and hence x(t) hardly varies. Moreover, it should be
mentioned that the two polar cases, i.e. κ → 0,∞, nest important classes of economic models.
First, for sufficiently high values of κ we have x(t) ≈ c˜(t) and, as a consequence, all that matters
for an agent’s utility is the current average consumption level in the economy. For this type
of preference structure the recent literature has coined the expression ”Keeping up with the
Joneses” 11. Second, κ→ 0, hence x(t) ≈ x(0), ∀t ∈ (0,∞), implies that the reference stock is
irrelevant to an agent’s utility and as a result U (·) collapses to the standard time-separable utility
representation. The cases implied by values of κ lying in between these extremal points, often
called ”Catching up with the Joneses”, will be the main focus of this paper. The importance
of comparison utility for an agent’s well-being is governed by the parameter β ∈ [0, 1]. For
β = 0 comparison utility is all that matters while if β = 1 individuals only care about their own
absolute consumption. In case of β ∈ (0, 1) both are attached with strictly positive utility.
Due to the fact that the reference stock is solely determined by c˜(t), preferences are by definition
outward-looking12. Moreover, individuals take the path of x(t) as given when making their
allocative decisions. This inevitably creates a negative externality since agents do not take into
account the effects of their own choices on the current and future reference stock of the others.
2.2 Technology and Accumulation
The model economy considered in this paper comprises two sectors: a final goods sector pro-
ducing a single, homogeneous, non-storable consumption good and an education sector creating
additional human capital. Each agent is endowed with one unit of time. Let χy,i and χh,i
denote the fraction of time individual i devotes to work in the goods sector and uses for edu-
cational purposes, respectively. For sake of simplicity leisure is not considered in this model,
hence notation can be simplified by writing χy,i = χi and χh,i = (1− χi). In each point in time
an individual’s final output yi(t) is determined by the stock of her accumulated physical, ki(t),
and human capital, hi(t), and the level of raw labor according to a constant returns to scale
technology13
yi(t) = φki(t)α (χi(t)hi(t))
1−α , (2)
10In this paper we denote q˙(t) ≡ ∂q(t)
∂t
11This specification of agents’ preferences has found widespread use, for instance, in work concerned with asset
pricing, (see Gal´ı (1994)), taxation, (see Ljungquist and Uhlig (2000)), and open economy issues, (see Fisher (2004)
and Fisher and Hof (2005)), to mention a few. Dupor and Liu (2003) go a step further and distinguish between
”Jealousy” and Keeping up with the Joneses. For an increase in aggregate consumption the first is associated with
a lower level of individuals utility whereas in the latter environment the marginal utility of individual consumption
rises relative to that of leisure.
12This is in contrast to inward looking behavior that constitutes the basis for the concept of habit formation.
It makes use of the assumption that agents’ own past consumption builds a habit typed reference stock.
13For future reference note that ”time” and ”raw labor” are used interchangeably.
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with α ∈ (0, 1) and φ > 0 denoting a technology shift parameter. Given that hi reflects
the efficiency per unit of raw labor supplied, χihi clearly signifies the amount of effective labor
used in the goods production. Final output can be either consumed currently or saved and
transformed into physical capital
k˙i(t) = φki(t)α (χi(t)hi(t))
1−α − ci(t)− δki(t), (3)
where δ ≥ 0 denotes the constant, exogenously given, capital depreciation rate. The educa-
tion sector utilizes human capital together with time to produce new human capital. In light
of recent empirical evidence I refrain from using the traditional assumption that the human
capital growth rate is linear in time. As pointed out by Alonso-Carrera (2001), results from
life-cycle earnings estimations strongly suggest strict concavity of the accumulation technology
in schooling time, implying diminishing private returns to education. Accounting for this fact
the human capital accumulation technology is postulated to be
h˙i(t) = ϕ (1− χi(t))ζ hi(t)− ηhi(t), (4)
with constant and exogenous parameters ϕ > 0, η ≥ 0 and ζ ∈ (0, 1).
3 Equilibrium Analysis
In a decentralized economy each agent i faces the following problem
max
(ci(t),χi(t))
∫ ∞
0
U (ci(t), c˜(t)) e−ρtdt, (5)
subject to
k˙i(t) = φki(t)α (χi(t)hi(t))
1−α − ci(t)− δki(t),
h˙i(t) = ϕ (1− χi(t))ζ hi(t)− ηhi(t),
ci(t) ≥ 0 ki(t) ≥ 0 hi(t) ≥ 0, χi(t) ∈ [0, 1] , ∀t ∈ [0,∞) ,
ki(0) = k0,i hi(0) = h0,i,
(6)
taking the path of x(t) ≥ 0 as given. Equations (5)-(6) denote a common dynamic optimiza-
tion problem with control variables ci(t) and χi(t) and state variables hi(t) and ki(t). From the
maximum principle we get a system of first-order necessary conditions for optimality
c(t)−σ
x(t)(1−β)(1−σ)
− pi(t) = 0, (7)
(1− α)pi(t)φk(t)
α (χ(t)h(t))1−α
χ(t)
− λ(t)ϕζh(t) (1− χ(t))ζ−1 = 0, (8)
6
−pi(t)
(
αφk(t)α (χ(t)h(t))1−α
k(t)
− δ − ρ
)
= p˙i(t), (9)
−pi(t)(1− α)φk(t)
α (χ(t)h(t))1−α
h(t)
− λ(t)
(
ϕ
(
1− χ(t)ζ
)
− η − ρ
)
= λ˙(t). (10)
The impact of consumption jealousy is clearly reflected by (7) that equates costs and benefits
of an additional unit of own consumption. A higher reference stock or a higher degree of
jealousy (reflected by a lower β) pushes-up the marginal utility of consumption, implying that an
additional unit becomes more valuable. Given the fact that the Hamiltonian function associated
with (5)-(6) is jointly concave in both choice variables c and χ the first order conditions are
not only necessary but also sufficient for optimality if, in addition, the following transversality
conditions are fulfilled
lim
t→∞ e
−ρtpii(t)ki(t) = 0, lim
t→∞ e
−ρtλi(t)hi(t) = 0.
The terms pi and λ denote the co-state variables associated with the physical and human
capital stock, respectively. In order to get a clear picture of the equilibrium concepts used in
the subsequent analysis, it is quite instructive to state the following definitions.
Definition 1 A symmetric perfect-foresight equilibrium consists of paths {c(t), χ(t), k(t),
h(t), x(t)}∞t=0 that solve the optimal control problem indicated in (5)-(6) for given initial condi-
tions k(0) = k0, h(0) = h0.
Note that this definition already accounts for the fact that due to agents’ symmetry in
preferences and endowments we have c˜ = ci = c and χi = χ.
Definition 2 A balanced growth path equilibrium (BGP) is a set of paths {c(t), χ(t),
k(t), h(t), x(t)}∞t=0 satisfying Definition 1 such that c(t), k(t), h(t), x(t) grow at a constant rate
and χ(t) is constant.
The optimality conditions together with the laws of motion for k, h and x can now be
combined yielding a five-dimensional system that fully describes the underlying dynamics of the
model economy 14
γc =
(
αφχ(t)1−αξ(t)−(1−α) − δ − ρ− (1− β) (1− σ)κ (ω(t)− 1)
)
σ−1, (11)
14In order to facilitate the analysis and to reduce notational clutter we define the following ratios that are
constant along the BGP ω = c/x, ν = c/k and ξ = k/h. Furthermore, we use γq ≡ q˙q .
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γχ =
[
−αν + ϕ (1− χ(t))ζ
(
1− χ(t) (1− ζ)
1− χ(t) − α
)
+ (1− α) (δ − η)
]
(
α+
(1− ζ)χ(t)
1− χ(t)
)−1
,
(12)
γk = φχ(t)1−αξ(t)−(1−α) − ν(t)− δ, (13)
γh = ϕ (1− χ(t))ζ − η γx = κ (ω(t)− 1) . (14)
Applying Definition 2 to the system above, we can immediately conclude that the key vari-
ables not only grow at a constant, but also common rate given by
γc∗ = γ =
αφ (χ∗/ξ∗)1−α − δ − ρ
1− β (1− σ) , (15)
and implying, γc = γk = γh = γx = γy ≡ γ. Before we continue our steady state analysis
let us stop at this point and take some time to reflect on the implications of (15). At a first
glance the equilibrium growth rate looks similar to the well-known Keynes-Ramsey rule in the
conventional Uzawa-Lucas two sector growth model. For comparison reasons let us denote it
by γKR. The numerator reflects the difference between the net marginal product of capital and
the discount rate. However, the denominator makes the crucial difference. For values of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution sufficiently large implying σ < 1 and for β ∈ (0, 1) it is
always true that γKR > γ. However, for empirically plausible values of σ, i.e. σ > 1 we get
the reverse case, γKR < γ. In addition, this relationship becomes more pronounced the higher
agents value status, i.e. for lower values of β. To develop the economic intuition underlying
this dependence, we need to go deeper into the steady state analysis. First, for convenience, we
rewrite the dynamic system in (11)-(14) using the ratio-definitions
γω =
[
αφχ(t)1−αξ(t)−(1−α) − δ − ρ− [1− β (1− σ)]κ (ω(t)− 1)
]
σ−1, (16)
γξ =
[
φχ(t)1−αξ(t)−(1−α) − ν(t)− δ − ϕ (1− χ(t))ζ + η
]
, (17)
γν =
[
φ (χ(t)/ξ(t))1−α (α− σ)− (1− σ) [(1− β)κ (ω(t)− 1) + δ] + ν(t)σ − ρ
]
σ−1, (18)
γχ =
[
−αν + ϕ (1− χ(t))ζ
(
1− χ(t) (1− ζ)
1− χ(t) − α
)
+ (1− α) (δ − η)
]
(
α+
(1− ζ)χ(t)
1− χ(t)
)−1
.
(19)
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Next, we assume that an interior BGP exists15.
Definition 3 An interior balanced growth path equilibrium is a set of paths {c(t),
χ(t), k(t), h(t), x(t)}∞t=0 satisfying Definition 2 and 0 < χ(t) < 1−
(
η
ϕ
) 1
ζ ∀t ∈ [0,∞).
Note that Definition (3) implies two things; first an interior BGP can only exist if both sectors
are active and second, the equilibrium growth rate is strictly positive, implying endogenous
growth. Ad hoc activity could in principle be ensured by the weaker condition χ ∈ (0, 1) but
the case χ ∈
(
1− (η/ϕ) 1ζ , 1
)
would not be sustainable since it implies hˆ(t) < 0 resulting in
limt→∞ h(t) = 0 and a shutdown of the goods sector.
Recall that by definition ν˙(t) = ξ˙(t) = ω˙(t) = χ˙(t) = 0 must hold along an interior balanced
growth path. Consequently, after setting (16)-(19) equal to zero we get, after a fair amount
of algebra, a system {ν∗ (χ∗) , ξ∗ (χ∗) , ω∗ (χ∗) , χ∗} that implicitly determines the equilibrium
values of the corresponding variables16.
To get a clear-cut picture of the steady state’s quantitative properties, we calibrate the
system and compare the results to features of actual economies. The parametrization we employ
is compactly summarized in Table (1).
Parametrization of the Benchmark economy
Preferences σ = 2.5, ρ = 0.04, β = 0.8, κ = 0.05
Production α = 0.4, φ = 1, ϕ = 0.08, ζ = 0.8
Accumulation δ = 0.05, η = 0.02
Table 1: Benchmark Parameters
The conventional preference and technology parameters are set in accordance with the lit-
erature, see e.g. Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993) and Ortigueira and Santos (2002), Lucas
(1990), Gong et al. (2004). Moreover, κ is chosen to fit plausible rates of convergence while the
value of β is set such that both, absolute and relative consumption are attached with positive
utility. Table (2) provides some rough impression about the features of the resulting benchmark
economy.
χ∗ k
∗
h∗
k∗
y∗
c∗
y∗ ι1 γ
0.680 5.288 3.425 0.787 0.056 0.0122
Table 2: Benchmark Economy
In fact, the results in Table 2 fit actual economic data remarkably well. Since the model
abstracts from population growth, aggregate values are associated with per capita values. In
light of this an equilibrium growth rate of 1.2% per annum seems to be quite plausible. The
15The proof of existence and uniqueness is provided below.
16The equilibrium expressions can be found in the appendix. Notice that a ∗ attached to a variable denotes its
steady-state value.
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capital-output ratio taking a value of 3.4 is very close to results obtained by Alvarez-Cuadrado et
al. (2004) and Eicher and Turnovsky (2001). Furthermore, the derived value of the consumption-
output ratio indicates that almost 79% of final output are devoted to individuals consumption.
In this case Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004) obtain a similar result. Given that we neglect
governmental activities, this value appears to be highly plausible. In addition, Table 2 attests
that individuals engage for slightly less than one third of their disposable time in education.
Accounting for the fact that the concept of education used in this paper includes all sorts of
human capital accumulation - not only formal schooling but also activities such as acquiring job
specific skills and knowledge, learning by doing or on the job training - the seemingly low value in
Table 2 turns out to be quite realistic. The capital stocks ratio indicates that in equilibrium the
physical capital stock of the economy is more than 5 times higher than its human capital stock.
Finally, ι1 which is the eigenvalue that satisfies 0 > ι1 > ι2 implies that the asymptotic speed of
convergence of the economy is around 5.6% per annum. This value exactly lies in the consensus
range of 3%−11% implying a high degree of empirical consistency. On the whole, the remarkable
fit of the indicated equilibrium features to the characteristics of actual economies makes us highly
confident of the model’s ability to generate also realistic and insightful transitional dynamics.
Using these results we can conduct some comparative statics analysis by computing the effects
of parametric changes on the equilibrium values. These results are displayed in Table 3 below.
χ∗ c/k∗ c/x∗ k/h∗ γ∗
∆κ 0 0 - 0 0
∆β + + - + -
∆φ 0 0 0 + 0
∆ϕ - + + - +
∆σ + + - + -
∆ρ + + - + -
Table 3: Effects of parametric changes on equilibrium values
Notice that the table also includes the equilibrium growth rate. The impact of the conven-
tional technology and preference parameters φ, ϕ, σ and ρ are fairly standard and well docu-
mented and interpreted by earlier studies, see e.g. Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993). However,
a thorough analysis on the influence of both new parameters β and κ, reflecting, respectively,
individuals’ desire for social status and the persistence of past average consumption, has been
lacking, as of yet, in an endogenous growth environment.
The effects of κ on the model’s steady-state values are not dramatic. Only the status-indicating
variable ω responds to changes in κ which is, after recalling the definition of ω, self-explanatory.
An increase in κ leads to faster adjustment of the reference stock, which in the limit approaches
c˜. Since c˜ = c due to symmetry, we have limκ→+∞ ω(κ) = 1. Despite modest steady-state
effects, κ nevertheless plays a crucial role in determining the model’s off-equilibrium behavior,
as we will see later on. In contrast, the impact of β on the model’s equilibrium is far more
complex. As indicated in the second row of Table 3, a lower degree of consumption enviousness
leads to a higher equilibrium final good employment, consumption-capital ratio, and physical to
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human capital ratio, whereas the steady state growth rate and relative consumption experience
a decline. The economic intuition behind these phenomena can be best elucidated using the
agent’s optimality conditions with respect to consumption, (7), and the state variable k, (9).
Given the fact that (∂Uc/∂β) < 0, we can conclude that an incremental increase in β lowers the
marginal utility of own consumption, which, as implied by the optimality condition, leads to a
drop in the shadow value of capital. As a consequence, its (negative) growth rate is stimulated.
The reestablishment of equality in equation pˆi(t) = −MPK(t) + δ + ρ, that results from the
agent’s first order conditions, requires an increase in the marginal product of capital (MPK)
which is achieved by a sufficiently large increase in activity in the final goods sector, χ. Since
we have (∂ξ∗(χ∗)/∂χ∗) > 0, ∀χ ∈
(
0, 1− (η/ϕ)1/ζ
)
, the physical to human capital ratio, ξ∗
increases but by less than χ is rises, i.e. ∆χ > ∆ξ 17. This yields the required condition
∂
(
χ∗
ξ∗
)
/∂χ∗ > 0 which causes the final rise in the marginal product. As shown in Table 3, the
long run growth impact of a higher β is clearly negative. Note that a rise in β in fact entails
two opposing effects on the equilibrium growth rate, which becomes clear by inspecting equation
(15). An indirect positive effect is triggered by the higher steady state marginal product of phys-
ical capital which enhances the numerator of (15) and, as a result, also growth. Weaker status
motives, on the other hand, also create a direct growth depressing effect. As can be inferred from
the human capital accumulation technology (4), the induced intersectoral reallocation of time
toward final goods production impacts growth in a negative way. For future reference, let’s de-
note these effects by ”marginal product effect” and ”reallocation effect”, respectively 18. For the
parametrization used above we get that the negative reallocation effect outweighs the positive
marginal product effect which finally results in the indicated negative overall effect. However,
the picture changes substantially when we vary the value of σ around one. In particular, if σ
is small enough, i.e. σ < 1, the signs in the second row of Table 3 are reversed, indicating the
opposite effects as described above. This leads us directly to our first result.
Result 1 For σ ∈ (0, 1) (respectively σ ∈ (1,+∞)) a lower degree of consumption jealousy,
i.e. a higher value of β, implies that the reallocation effect is positive (negative) and stronger
(weaker) than the negative (positive) marginal product effect, resulting in an overall positive
(negative) impact on the equilibrium growth rate. For the knife edge case, σ = 1, changes in the
status motive have no impact on equilibrium allocations and growth.
Furthermore, the positive response of the consumption-capital ratio, ν∗ depicted in Table 3
is intimately connected to the increase in labor since (∂ν∗(χ∗)/∂χ∗) > 0. Finally, it remains to
explain the negative impact of weaker status motives on relative consumption. In fact, this turns
out to be pretty straightforward. Rearranging the instantaneous utility function given in (1)
to explicitly model the status dependence yields U (c(t), ω(t)) = (1− σ)−1 (c(t)βω(t)1−β)1−σ,
17This result can be established using the steady state value of ξ∗, see equation (27) in the appendix. Values
of χ outside this range would not fulfill this condition but since we are considering only interior equilibria we can
omit them.
18To be precise, the marginal product effect in this paper generally denotes the positive stimulus for consumption
growth caused by a higher marginal product of capital. It is, therefore, equivalent to what Alvarez-Cuadrado et
al. (2004) call the rate of return effect.
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from which we can infer that for an increasing β the benefit of an additional unit of relative
consumption declines steadily, i.e. ∂Uω/∂β < 0. A low marginal utility of ω, caused by a high
β, induces agents to accumulate less of it which finally results in the negative response displayed
in Table 3. This section can be concluded by stating another important result.
Result 2 An economy that awards an agent’s level of consumption with social status devotes
more time to education and as a consequence exhibits a relatively higher human than physical
capital stock than an economy with weaker or no status valuation.
3.1 Existence and Uniqueness of a Steady State Equilibrium
For notational convenience, let us first define m ≡ 1 − (η/ϕ) 1ζ and Ξ = {χ ∈ < : 0 < χ < m}.
To establish existence of an interior equilibrium, we need to find a χ ∈ Ξ that solves the system
{ν∗ (χ∗) , ξ∗ (χ∗) , ω∗ (χ∗) , χ∗}. For this purpose we define the function F : [0, 1)→ < using the
implicit equilibrium expression for χ∗.
F (χ) = ϕ (1− χ)ζ−1 [ζχ+ β (1− σ) (1− χ)]− ρ− βη (1− σ) (20)
Any χ that solves F (χ) = 0 and satisfies χ ∈ Ξ is a candidate for an interior equilibrium.
This leads us to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 If β (1− σ) (ϕ− η) < ρ < ζη
(
m
1−m
)
, then there exists a unique χ∗ ∈ Ξ such
that the quadruple (ν∗(χ∗), ξ∗(χ∗), ω∗(χ∗), χ∗) constitutes an interior balanced growth path equi-
librium.
Proof. The proof itself is straightforward. Notice that F (χ) is at least twice continuously
differentiable for all χ in the domain. As a first step we have to check the properties of the
function F (χ) at the boundaries, i.e. limχ→0 F (χ) and limχ→m F (χ). For these we get
lim
χ→0
F (χ) = β (1− σ) (ϕ− η)− ρ,
and
lim
χ→mF (χ) = ζη
((
ϕ
η
) 1
ζ
− 1
)
− ρ.
Another important ingredient is the slope of F (χ).
Fχ =
ϕζ
(1− χ)1−ζ
[
1− χζ
1− χ − β (1− σ)
]
Since ϕζ
(1−χ)1−ζ > 0 and
1−χζ
1−χ ≥ 1, ∀χ ∈ [0, 1), we see that Fχ > 0, ∀χ ∈ Ξ. The picture
that emerges from this exposition suggests that F (χ) is a strictly increasing function ∀χ ∈ Ξ.
Accounting for this fact, the proof essentially reduces to verifying that ∃χ ∈ Ξ such that F (·) =
0. Since F (·) is strictly increasing, it is clearly the case that an interior equilibrium can exist iff
F (0) < 0 and F (m) > 0. From the limiting behavior properties of F (χ), we can infer that the
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necessary and sufficient conditions for these cases are σ > 1− ρβ(ϕ−η) and ζη
((
ϕ
η
) 1
ζ − 1
)
−ρ > 0.
After some simple rearrangement, we obtain the condition used in Proposition 1. To finalize
the proof, note that the solution candidate needs to fulfill both transversality conditions. We
know that in the limit the transversality conditions can be expressed as −ρ + γλ + γh < 0 and
−ρ+ γpi + γk < 0. Using (9) and (10) yields
− χ(t)
(1− χ(t))1−ζ < 0,
and
− αϕζχ(t)
(1− χ(t))1−ζ < 0,
which both hold for all χ ∈ Ξ. As a result, we can conclude that an interior balanced growth
equilibrium exists if both conditions σ > 1 − ρβ(ϕ−η) and ζη
((
ϕ
η
) 1
ζ − 1
)
− ρ > 0 are satisfied.
Furthermore, uniqueness is given by the fact that F (χ) is strictly increasing and, hence, the
F (χ) = 0 line can be crossed only once.
3.2 Local Stability Analysis
The local stability properties of an equilibrium can, in general, be studied by analyzing the
structure of the eigenvalues of the dynamic system that has been linearized around its steady
state. For this purpose we take the fourth-order dynamic system in (16)-(19) and apply first
order Taylor expansions to approximate the models dynamics

ω˙
ξ˙
ν˙
χ˙
 =

−ω∗κ[1−β(1−σ)]
σ j12 0 − ξ
∗
χ∗ j12
0 j22 −ξ∗ ξ∗
(
σ
ω∗αj14 +
1
χ∗ j44
)
−ν∗(1−σ)(1−β)κ
σ
ν∗(α−σ)
ω∗α j12 ν
∗ − ξ∗χ∗ j32
0 0 j43 ζϕ (1− χ∗)ζ−1 χ∗


∆ω
∆ξ
∆ν
∆χ
 . (21)
For tractability, we define, j22 = − (1− α)
(
ν∗ + δ + ϕ (1− χ∗)ζ − η
)
,
j12 = −ω∗αφ (1− α) (χ∗/ξ∗)1−α (ξ∗σ)−1, j43 = −αχ
∗(1−χ∗)
α(1−χ∗)+χ∗(1−ζ) and ∆ω = ω−ω∗. The terms jmn
denote the matrix element in themth row and nth column. To check the local stability properties
of the system it would, in principle, be sufficient to determine the signs of the eigenvalues of the
Jacobian. Doing this in an analytical way can be quite challenging, however. A proper way to
circumvent difficulties that are due to a high degree of complexity is to solve for sign-indicating
conditions, i.e. conditions from which one can draw conclusions about the properties of the
eigenvalues and hence the stability of the system19. Nevertheless, solving for these conditions in
19In the case of a two dimensional system these conditions are simply the trace and the determinant of the
corresponding Jacobian matrix, while in a three-dimensional system the term j12j22 + j13j31 + j23j32 − j11j22 −
j11j33 − j22j33 < 0 is an additional condition.
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our fourth-order system turns out to be intractable as well. An elegant way out is to evaluate
the roots by calibrating the model’s structural parameters with precise values. The strategy
that is adopted in this procedure, however, accounts for the fact that the literature is sparse
about precise or even the range of values of non-conventional preference parameters such as β
and κ. This problem is tackled by simply computing the models eigenvalues for a broad range
of possible values of β and κ, while the remaining parameters are set in accordance with the
empirical literature. Results are reported in Table 4 below. Notice that the table contains only
the negative eigenvalues.
κ
β 0.05 0.1 0.3 0.7 2 10
0 -0.0334 -0.0574 r = -0.1359 -0.1591 -0.1501 -0.1484
-0.1357 -0.1324 +/- 0.0354i -0.2746 -0.8054 -4.0085
0.3 -0.0428 -0.0774 r = -0.1596 -0.1414 -0.1391 -0.1384
-0.1294 -0.1244 +/- 0.0197i -0.4110 -1.1683 -5.8096
0.6 -0.0511 -0.0960 -0.1354 -0.1324 -0.1317 -0.1314
-0.1262 -0.1197 -0.2331 -0.5407 -1.5298 -7.6103
1 -0.0609 -0.1109 -0.1248 -0.1248 -0.1248 -0.1248
-0.1248 -0.1248 -0.3109 -0.7109 -2.0109 -10.0109
Note: the remaining parameters are the same as in Table 3
Table 4: Asymptotic Speed of Convergence
This simple calibration exercise indeed sheds some light on the structure of the eigenvalues.
As clearly indicated in Table 4, the system possesses two stable and two unstable eigenvalues,
from which we can deduce the existence of local saddle path stability20. Recalling, however,
that for parameter values with less empirical support the model might display contrary stability
features, we deal the subsequent analysis with great care. Notice that apart from stability consid-
erations, the eigenvalues in Table 4 can also be consulted to draw conclusions on the asymptotic
speed of convergence of the model’s variables. In principle, we know that the asymptotic behav-
ior of a m-dimensional dynamic system exhibiting saddle path stability is essentially governed
by the eigenvalue ιi that satisfies 0 > ιi > ιj > ... > ιm/2. From Table 4 we can infer that
the displayed eigenvalues ι1 with ι1 > ι2 span a range of −0.033 to −0.15, indicating that the
economy asymptotically converges at rates of 3% to 15% per annum toward its steady state. The
empirical evidence on the adjustment speed is, in fact, far from being in unison. Early studies in
this field (see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992)) found values around 2% per annum whereas
more recent results suggest annual rates up to 11% (e.g. Islam (1995) and Caselli et al. (1996)).
Our model perfectly matches these results for the whole range of β and sufficiently low values
of κ, i.e. κ < 0.3. High values of κ appear to be implausible, since they would imply rates of
convergence up to 16%.
20Observe that for selected combinations of parameters we get complex roots indicating cyclical behavior of the
system.
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4 Transitional and global dynamics
4.1 The Benchmark Economy
Having conducted a fruitful equilibrium and stability analysis, we now concentrate our attention
to the characterization of the model’s behavior outside the steady state. The transitional dy-
namics in one-sector neoclassical and two-sector endogenous growth models is now, in general,
well understood thanks to insightful studies by Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993), Bond et al.
(1996) and Eicher and Turnovsky (2001), to mention just a few. Nevertheless the importance
of transition in the recent literature is generally underestimated and, hence, carelessly handled.
As a result, the focus of numerous studies is on balanced growth properties only, without paying
sufficient attention to the off-equilibrium behavior. This is problematic insofar as, first, the
authors implicitly or even explicitly assume existence of a steady state without ensuring that
the economy actually converges to an equilibrium at all. And second, as shown by Mulligan
and Sala-i-Martin (1992), periods of transition can be rather long implying that off-equilibrium
conditions might have a substantial quantitative impact on the overall economic performance.
Noteworthy exceptions to this practice are Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004), Alonso-Carrera
(2001) and Caballe and Santos (1993). The stability analysis above indeed gives rise to the con-
jecture that transitional dynamics might play a substantial role in our model. Given that the
conditions for saddle path stability are satisfied the off-equilibrium dynamics is governed by two
negative eigenvalues so that the stable manifold is two-dimensional21. As pointed out by Eicher
and Turnovsky (2001), a two-dimensional transition path substantially enriches the model’s
dynamics by introducing additional flexibility that allows its behavior to mimic important fea-
tures of economic data. They mention that as a direct consequence of a higher dimensional
adjustment locus the speed of convergence might differ across variables, which permits a more
flexible time path22. Moreover, adjustment paths need not be monotonic. Since the dynamics is
determined by two negative eigenvalues, their respective influence on the adjustment is subject
to variations as time proceeds implying also the possibility of overshooting. Finally, systems
with two or higher dimensional stable manifolds might respond asymmetrically to positive or
negative shocks of equal magnitude. This is in clear contrast to conventional one-sector growth
models in which the response to a positive shock is just the mirror image of the same nega-
tive shock (Eicher and Turnovsky, 2001). To study the transitional dynamics in our model,
we assume that the system summarized in (16)-(19) is initially in equilibrium. Thereafter, we
confront the model by specific shocks and trace out the subsequent time path of some selected
key variables. The strategy we adopt therein implicitly makes use of the fact that due to the
21The stable manifold is the locus of points from which the respective variables asymptotically converge to their
equilibrium values if they are allowed to evolve according to their laws of motion. In the well-known Ramsey
optimal growth model, for instance, the stable manifold is one-dimensional implying that for each value of k
(physical capital) there exists a unique c (consumption) that places the economy on the stable arm of the saddle
path. The same applies to most classes of one-sector growth models including the AK model.
22More precisely, this allows variables to evolve virtually independently from the time path of other variables. In
their paper, Eicher and Turnovsky (2001) consider a two-sector non-scale growth model that permits technology
and physical capital to evolve independently and at different adjustment speeds that is consistent with empirical
evidence.
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local stability characteristics, the economy returns to the BGP equilibrium after it was hit by
a shock. Consequently, after implementing a specific disturbance, we can numerically simulate
the time path of selected variables to reproduce the transitional dynamics until the economy
reaches the equilibrium path again23.
4.2 The Set Up
Given that the transitional adjustment locus is a two-dimensional stable saddle path, we can
express the stable solution of (16)-(19) in terms its eigenvalues and -vectors. This enables us to
separate the interdependent system and get self-contained equations, which greatly facilitates
the subsequent analysis. In particular, making use of the two stable roots denoted by ιi, with
ι2 < ι1 < 0, and the associated normalized eigenvectors, υi = (υ1i, 1, υ3i, υ4i)
′, we can reformulate
the generic form of any two variables in (16)-(19) to explicitly express their time path during
transition.
ω(t) = ω∗ +
[
(ω0 − ω∗)
(
υ11e
ι1t − υ12eι2t
)− (ξ0 − ξ∗) υ11υ12 (eι1t − eι2t)] (υ11 − υ12)−1 (22)
ξ(t) = ξ∗ +
[
(ω0 − ω∗)
(
eι1t − eι2t)− (ξ0 − ξ∗) (υ12eι1t − υ11eι2t)] (υ11 − υ12)−1 (23)
For expositional convenience, we depict here only the path of the capital stocks ratio, ξ
and comparison consumption ω 24. However, the remaining ones, i.e. for χ and ν, can be
established analogously. From (22) we can immediately infer that if t → +∞, ω(t) = ω∗.
The same, of course, applies to ξ, χ and ν implying that the economy asymptotically returns
to its equilibrium path. However, this adjustment behavior need not be monotonous. The
off-equilibrium dynamics of the variables under scrutiny can now analytically be approximated
by (
ω˙(t)
ξ˙(t)
)
=
1
υ12 − υ11
(
υ12ι2 − υ11ι1 υ12υ11 (ι1 − ι2)
ι2 − ι1 υ12ι1 − υ11ι2
)(
ω(t)− ω∗
ξ(t)− ξ∗
)
. (24)
It might come as surprise that the original interrelated fourth-order system expressed in
(16)-(19) can be reduced to two-dimensional systems without loosing any feedback information
coming from the respective isolated variables. Or to state it more clearly, why should the
original interdependence of ξ and χ in (16)-(19) be decoupled and simply disappear? Concerning
this issue, Eicher and Turnovsky (2001, p.97, footnote 13) point out that despite there is no
apparent link between the imbedded and the detached variables the system takes fully account
of the feedback namely through the two eigenvalues. As a result, the dynamics expressed in
23Notice that the equilibrium is in fact reached when t→ +∞, hence the simulation is just an approximation,
even though a very precise one.
24Notice that equations (22)-(23) can be derived by using the generic form ω(t)− ω∗ = K1υ11eι1t +K2υ12eι2t
and ξ(t)−ξ∗ = K1eι1t+K2eι2t. The constant coefficients Ki, i = 1, 2 can be computed from the initial conditions.
In particular, set t = 0 and express Ki by successive substitution. Re-substituting finally yields (22)-(23).
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phase-space (24) can be illustrated graphically by means of a two-dimensional phase diagram.
By construction, this system possesses two eigenvalues with 0 > ι1 > ι2, implying that (24)
represents a stable sink. To develop a proper intuition about the underlying structure of the
adjustment dynamics, we use Figure 1 to illustrate the corresponding ω, ξ phase-space with
the ω˙ = 0 and the ξ˙ = 0 isoclines. Observe that both the ω˙ = 0 and the ξ˙ = 0 isoclines are
downward-sloping. Lower comparison consumption, ω ≡ c/x, decelerates reference stock growth
which necessitates a lower γc to remove the induced imbalance, i.e. to reinstall ω˙ = 0. This can
be achieved by reducing the marginal product of physical capital, which requires a higher k or
equivalently a lower h both resulting in a higher ξ. On the other hand, an increased ω implies
a higher c which disequilibrates ξ˙ = 0 through depressing k˙. Since h˙ is unaffected, balancing
ξ˙ = 0 again requires a higher average product of physical capital, procurable by a lower ξ.
4.3 Numerical Analysis
4.3.1 Case 1: Productivity Shocks
In the first case we consider a one per cent positive, permanent productivity shock occurring in
the final goods sector. In the language of the model this can simulated by an increase in the
productivity parameter φ. From Table 3 we can infer that in the long run this affects only the
capital stocks ratio ξ. Since ∂ξ∗/∂φ > 0, i.e. the actual capital stocks ratio at impact is too
low, combined with the fact that capital adjustment can not be instantaneous suggests that the
transition of ξ toward its new equilibrium value entails a variety of adjustment effects. This is
further supported by the close interdependence of the involved variables, implying a multiplicity
of feedback effects. As noted at the outset, higher dimensional adjustment loci, basically, allow
for non-monotonic adjustment behavior. In the case of a productivity shock, however, the capital
stocks ratio, ξ, evolves monotonically, which is implied by (22). Due to ω0 = ω∗, the time path
essentially reduces to ξ(t) = ξ∗ − (ξ∗ − ξ0)
(
υ12e
ι1t − υ11eι2t
)
(υ12 − υ11)−1. ι1 > ι2 and ξ∗ > ξ0,
which further implies that we must have
(
υ12e
ι1t − υ11eι2t
)
(υ12 − υ11)−1 > 0, resulting in a
monotonic adjustment path. This need not be the case for the remaining variables. Figure 1
now sketches the off-equilibrium dynamics of some selected variables. In particular, Panel a.)
depicts the phase space describing the transition process of comparison consumption, ω and the
capital stocks ratio, ξ. The dynamics of working time, χ, and the consumption-capital ratio,
ν, are, respectively, displayed in Panel b.). There, the solid (dotted) line representing χ (ν)
is associated with the left (right) vertical axes. From a general perspective, one might also be
interested in the growth path of some conventional variables such as output, consumption and
human capital. Panel c.) therefore summarizes the dynamics of these variables. Panels d.) - e.)
will be referred to later on. The model’s parametrization is chosen to fit yearly observations,
hence, the simulated time horizon spans about 100 years. However, most of the adjustment
variation takes place in the first 25 years.
Panels a.) - c.), indeed, display a remarkable, mostly non-monotonous, adjustment behavior
of the indicated variables. Most of them undergo periods of rising and falling growth rates
respectively levels, though in the end only ξ exhibits a permanent change. Furthermore, panels
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Figure 1: Adjustment Paths in Response to a Productivity Shock
a.)-c.) suggest a natural division of the whole time horizon in two consecutive intervals, i.e.
[0, A) and (A,∞).
Considering the transitional dynamics in detail, we observe that a positive productivity shock
pushes-up the steady-state ratio of the two capital stocks, implying a too low ξ at impact.
Since agents intersectorally allocate their disposable time such that marginal benefits equalize
across sectors, a lower-than equilibrium ξ depresses the marginal product of effective labor in
the final goods sector. This induces agents to shift time toward education in order to recover the
balance called by optimality condition (8). But since ∂χ∗/∂φ = 0, this shift poses a departure
from the equilibrium path entailing a variety of repercussions. The following section is devoted
to analyzing the first-period dynamics. Most importantly, a low ξ is intimately associated
with a high average and marginal product of physical capital25. Combined with the increased
25For notational convenience let APK and MPK denote the average and marginal product of physical capital
respectively.
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productivity φ this encourages agents to save and hence stimulates investment. The case α < σ
implies that capital growth is initially stimulated by more than consumption growth, hence
∆γk > ∆γc causes a decline in ν. Moreover, the highMPK accelerates consumption growth such
that γc > γc∗ . This leads to an upward movement of ω which, in turn, pushes the reference stock
growth rate, γx. From Ucx > 0 we know that an increased reference stock growth additionally
stimulates consumption growth since agents appreciate higher own consumption more for greater
values of x. To sum it up we can conclude that there are two reinforcing effects driving the
growth rate of consumption. The well known marginal product effect and an effect which the
literature calls the status effect26. In equation (7) these are represented by the first and the
last term respectively27. For the baseline parameterization, however, the latter is negligible due
to a low value of κ which implies only sluggish adjustment of the reference stock. This result
can be used to finalize the line of argument about the behavior of comparison consumption, ω.
Consumption growth is stimulated mainly due to a high MPK, the reference stock x on the
other hand increases only moderately implying that γω is initially positive as displayed in Panel
a.).
We have briefly mentioned that due to ∆γc < ∆γk, ν experiences a decline. In fact, this is a final
outcome resulting from the interplay of two opposing effects that deserve explicit mention since
they will play a key role in determining the location of the turning point A. First, as mentioned
above, α < σ implies a greater stimulus for capital than for consumption growth caused by the
low ξ. In terms of equation (14), this impacts γν in a negative way. Second, because the status
effect exhibits a tendency to promote consumption growth it implicitly hampers the decline in
ν. Initially the first dominates the latter effect implying a negative overall impact which is also
displayed by the dotted line in panel b.). As afore mentioned, the adjustment in ξ can not be
immediate, but it is monotonous. The latter point should not conceal, however, that also here
there are opposing forces at work. The reallocation of raw labor χ toward education stimulates
human capital accumulation, as indicated by the solid lines in Panels b.)-c.). This would, in
principle, lower ξ, but the effect is negligible compared to the increase in γk, however.
The local stability and monotonicity properties imply that ξ < ξ∗ is associated with γξ > 0
and limt→∞ ξ(t) = ξ∗. As a result, if ξ is lower than its long run value, due, for instance, to
a shock, it returns to the - probably new - equilibrium path again. In the case at hand, the
reestablishment of ξ can be accomplished in two different ways either through increased savings,
which is reflected by a lower ν, or through higher work effort. Given the initial decrease in χ,
the investment effect needs to dominate the outflow of raw labor to stay in accordance with the
monotonicity property.
Clearly, the underlying dynamics in period [0, A) is not sustainable, since it implies χ < χ∗,
ν < ν∗, ω > ω∗. At point A the ongoing outflow of raw labor, respectively, the increase in ξ,
have reduced the MPK and APK considerably. Simultaneously, the positive γω has boosted ω
sufficiently so that the induced higher reference stock growth rate exactly balances consumption
growth, leading to a subsequent decline in comparison consumption. At the same time the
26The creation of this name can be awarded to Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004).
27It should be noted that for values of σ low enough, i.e. σ < 1, the status effect appears to be negative.
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increased reference stock growth has accelerated γc sufficiently such that γc > γk, implying that
ν starts to rise 28. To be precise, at A we have ω˙ = ν˙ = χ˙ = 0, but since ξ < ξ∗, it is unstable
and makes further adjustment necessary. In fact, in the subsequent interval (A,∞), the effects
which we have identified in [0, A) are exactly reversed. Hence, ω starts to decline, the back-
flow of χ depresses human capital growth and γc > γk helps to ”recover” ν. Furthermore, ξ
continues its monotonic increase. But in contrast to the previous time interval, its adjustment
is now propelled by the increasing work effort, since the rising ν now puts downward pressure
on ξ.
As previously mentioned, the parameter κ that governs the speed of reference stock adjust-
ment and, hence, the size of comparison consumption ω has some significant impact on the
transitional dynamics generated by the model. To get a clear picture of the actual influence,
consider Panels d.) and e.) of Figure 1 illustrate the adjustment path of (ω, ξ) and χ for
κ = 0.05, 0.1, 0.7, 2 respectively 29. Panel d.) indicates that the deviation of ω from its equilib-
rium path gets smaller for higher κ. The initial impact, however, remains the same for all values.
In contrast, a higher adjustment speed, entirely reverses the impact on working time χ, which
can be observed in Panel e.). The underlying mechanics can be described as follows: to begin,
note that a higher κ raises the reference stock x and, hence, reduces comparison consumption
ω, although it boosts γx. The latter implies that the status effect now plays an important role
through stimulating consumption growth, indeed the higher κ is, the more pronounced the sta-
tus effect becomes. As a consequence, for κ sufficiently high we get γc > γk, resulting in νˆ > 0.
Given that Ucx > 0, a higher reference stock pushes the marginal utility of own consumption
and, therefore, encourages higher work effort in the final goods sector. This pattern is reflected
in Panel e.), where paths of χ are traced out for different values of κ. For the purpose of sep-
arating the effects on initial labor supply caused by the respective status parameters β and κ,
we carry out the same exercise as above for different values of β. Interestingly, we find that
the value of β is completely irrelevant for the initial response of χ. This implies that for all
possible degrees of consumption jealousy, i.e. β ∈ [0, 1], the movement of χ at impact is purely
governed by the adjustment speed κ. In the standard time-separable utility representation, a
positive productivity shock is usually followed by an immediate expansion of individuals’ labor
supply. In contrast, our model suggests that for a fairly plausible parametrization and a utility
representation that accounts for out- and backward-looking behavior, this might change for the
reasons mentioned above. The intuition underlying Panel d.) can be explained rather briefly.
As mentioned above, higher κ increases γx one for one, but consumption growth only by a fac-
tor − (1− β) (1− σ)σ−1 which is strictly less than one. As a result the growth in comparison
consumption is slowed down. In the limit ω takes the value of one implying a monotonous
response during transition, purely governed by the marginal product effect30. In order to bring
the reasoning above into a proper order let us state the following results.
Result 3 The transition of ξ with ξ < ξ∗ entails two reinforcing effects on consumption growth.
28This tendency is also supported by the reduced capital stock growth rate that is due to the decrease in APK.
29Note that the paths of (ω, ξ) were normalized to make them comparable.
30Limit in the sense that limκ→+∞ ω(κ).
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First, the higher-than equilibrium marginal product of capital stimulates γc through the famil-
iar marginal product effect already mentioned in Result 1. Second, the thereby induced higher
reference stock growth enhances the envy motive, which pushes the marginal product of own con-
sumption and, hence, additionally accelerates consumption growth. The magnitude of the latter
so-called status effect is primarily determined by and positively related to the speed of reference
stock adjustment κ.
Result 4 The adjustment process following a positive productivity shock includes periods of
increasing and decreasing work effort. For adjustment speeds sufficiently high (low), the economy
responds to the productivity disturbance by initially increasing (decreasing) the work effort and
correspondingly decreasing (increasing) educational activities. Having reached the turning point
A, these effects are exactly reversed31.
4.3.2 Case 2: Preference Shocks
In the second case we address the adjustment effects in response to a preference shock. This
shock which is induced by a joint change in the parameters β and κ is designed to mimic a certain
phenomenon that was clearly observable in the recent past and substantially affected the market
of a particular status good which is the mobile phone. This phenomenon can be characterized
by the contraction of the product’s life cycle that was accompanied by an increase in the degree
of individuals’ ”consumption enviousness”. When the mobile phone market started to take
off in the mid-nineties, firms generally launched their products in half year or year intervals.
Interestingly, during the boom period these periods have shortened significantly and so that
every few months a ”brand new” Nokia, Ericson, etc. enters the market. Surely, some fraction
of these product-rollouts might be motivated by improved, or even innovative, technical features
that potentially enrich and facilitate the wireless communication process. We claim, however,
that a substantial fraction of launches is not necessarily driven by product advancements, but is
rather targeted at the satisfaction of people’s demand for ”pseudo-innovative” products, which
are ”Pseudo-innovative” in the sense that it is primarily the product’s design that changed
rather than the underlying technology. Thus, it was simply ”old wine in new bottles”. At the
same time, people became more and more keen to acquire new phones, no matter for how long
they had their ”old” ones. This specific habit was additionally stimulated by certain contract
conditions set by the service providers that offer the customer to get a new mobile phone after
a pre-specified period of time at particularly favorable terms. Since it became increasingly
important to possess the newest type, mobile phones clearly deserve being labeled as a status
good. In the language of our model the observed behavior can be simulated by a permanent
increase in κ, i.e. recent consumption matters more, and a simultaneous decrease in β, reflecting
a strengthened envy motive. As can be inferred from Table 3, variations in κ entail only moderate
31At a first glance the countercyclical movement in hours worked in the goods sector, as illustrated in Figure 1,
can not be reconciled with the traditional RBC literature following Kydland and Prescott’s (1982) seminal work.
There a favorable productivity shock is usually followed by a boost in work effort. However, a number of recent
studies, most notable Gal´ı (1999), Francis and Ramey (2002) and Basu et al. (1998) have argued that positive
technology shocks may reduce work effort in the short run which is actually consistent with our findings.
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steady state effects. In particular, a boost in κ lowers comparison consumption ω, since it drives
up the reference stock x, whereas all other key steady state variables remain unchanged. In
contrast, a drop in β causes a multiplicity of equilibrium effects. For instance, work effort in
goods production, χ, the consumption capital ratio, ν, and the capital stock ratio, ξ, are all
subject to long-run reductions, while comparison consumption ω and the equilibrium growth
rate γ experience a permanent boost. These features are all very well displayed in Figure 2 that
summarizes the adjustment dynamics in response to the outlined preference shock. Similar to
Figure 1, Panel a.) sketches the paths of comparison consumption ω and ξ in the respective
phase space. Panel b.) again describes the transition of work effort and the consumption-
capital ratio, whereas Panel c.) illustrates the behavior of some key aggregate variables. Panel
d.) will be referred to later on. In the numerical analysis the value of κ (= 0.2) is chosen to
generate reasonable asymptotic convergence behavior while β (= 0.7) is set to reflect only a
modest increase in status aspiration. To trace out the transitional dynamics of the model, we
observe that the joint variation in κ and β reduces the equilibrium work effort in the goods
production, hence, the value of χ at impact is clearly too high relative to its new equilibrium
value. Furthermore, recall that ∂ (χ∗/ξ∗) /∂χ∗ > 0. Combining both observations we can state
that the ratio χ/ξ at impact is also higher than it is along the new BGP. This implies that the
marginal product of effective labor in the goods producing sector, given by (1− α)φ (ξ/χ)α,
initially falls behind its new long-run value, creating an intersectoral imbalance. Reestablishing
the marginal product equality across sectors necessitates, therefore, a reallocation of time toward
education. The resulting reduction in working time is reflected by the solid line in Panel b.).
The adjustment dynamics of comparison consumption ω can be studied fairly briefly since
we have discussed some fundamental (inter)dependencies of c and x previously. First, notice
that due to χ/ξ > χ∗/ξ∗, the marginal product of physical capital at impact exceeds its new
equilibrium value. This entails the familiar rate of return effect which pushes-up consumption
growth. The final movement of ω is, however, composed of two opposing effects. The rate
of return effect generally puts upward pressure on ω, while the accelerated reference stock
growth - that is due to the jump in κ - potentially reduces it. Interestingly, even for small
positive deviations of κ, the latter negative effect dominates the positive, leading to a downward-
shift in comparison consumption ω. Intuitively, a reduction in β puts more weight on the
comparison element in the utility representation, suggesting a higher equilibrium value of ω,
while a higher reference stock, induced by an increased κ, ceteris paribus, reduces ω. For the
parametrization chosen in this experiment the rise in κ suffices to generate a lower BGP value
of comparison consumption. The corresponding transition process from an initially high ω to
its new equilibrium value is illustrated in Panel a.). The adjustment locus of the capital stocks
ratio ξ, implicitly depicted in the same phase space, features - in contrast to all other variables
- a highly non-monotonic behavior. As the comparative statics exercise in Table 3 suggest, the
capital ratio at impact is too high relative to its long run value. The initially high labor-capital
ratio, χ/ξ, unambiguously drives up the average product of physical capital (APK) and hence
stimulates investment. Consequently, the growth rate of physical capital γk experiences a boost.
Even though the flow of raw time χ into the education sector pushes-up as well the human capital
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Figure 2: Adjustment Paths in Response to a Preference Shock
growth rate γh, the increase in γk initially outweighs the rise in γh. Hence, ∆γk > ∆γh leads
to a shift in the relative capital intensity toward physical capital, i.e. ξ rises. This situation,
clearly, is not sustainable. Both the continuous outflow of χ and the rise in ξ reduce the APK
of physical capital and hence γk, while increasing schooling efforts further push γh. At the
turning point A, γk (γh) is reduced (increased) sufficiently so that subsequently γk < γh and,
thus, ∆ξ < 0. The observed overshooting behavior of the relative capital intensity becomes
more and more pronounced for rising values of κ as Panel d.) illustrates. This can be best
explained using the agent’s optimality condition for consumption. Given own consumption c, a
higher κ pushes the reference stock x to a higher path and, hence, raises the marginal utility
of consumption at each point in time. To re-establish optimality, a higher shadow value of
physical capital is then required, which automatically poses an additional incentive to invest.
The increased capital stock growth rate further promotes the overshooting. However, for very
high adjustment speeds this pattern changes again, since a sufficiently high κ implies x ≈ c and,
hence, ω ≈ 1. This causes an almost immediate jump to the new equilibrium value of ω, while ξ
adjusts sluggishly. As a final remark concerning the equilibrium growth rate, we can state that
due to the shift in raw time toward education, the human capital growth rate and, hence, the
economy’s aggregate growth rate rises over time. To conclude this section, we can summarize
the observed (ir)regularities in the following Result.
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Result 5 The adjustment process following a preference shock - that is induced by an upward-
jump, respectively reduction, in the degree of consumption jealousy and backward-looking behavior
- implies an overshooting relative capital intensity, which becomes more pronounced for a more
presence orientated comparison behavior.
The quantitative implications for the economy’s steady state of both, the productivity and
the preference shock, are compactly summarized in Table 5. For comparison reasons it reports
also pre-shock benchmark values of the respective variables.
Labor k/h k/y c/y c/x Growth rate
Benchmark 0.680 5.288 3.425 0.787 1.244 0.0122
Productivity Shock 0.680 5.377 3.425 0.787 1.244 0.0122
Preference Shock 0.670 5.239 3.434 0.784 1.065 0.0129
Table 5: Productivity and Preference Shock
The status augmented model proposed in this paper basically nests important classes of
macro-models as polar cases. First, the conventional two sector growth model based on work by
Lucas (1988) and extensively analyzed by Eicher and Turnovsky (2001), Ortigueira and Santos
(2002) and Bond et al. (1996) can be mimicked by setting β = 1. In this case the interde-
pendent fourth-order system in (16)-(19) is partly decoupled and comparison consumption ω
evolves without generating any feedback effects. The underlying equilibrium and transitional
dynamics of the reduced third-order system has been analyzed by Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin
(1993) at great length. It crucially differs from the model at hand mainly with respect to the
(non)monotonicity in the adjustment behavior. The introduced flexibility that is due to the two
dimensional adjustment locus allows for explaining movements in and features of the data that
the conventional two-sector growth model is not able to reproduce. Particularly, the fluctuation
pattern of labor supply in response to a productivity shock appears to be more realistic than the
monotonous adjustment paths implied by traditional two-sector modeling devices. Second, as
mentioned at the outset for κ→∞, the set-up comprises a certain type of preference structure
for which the literature coined the name ”Keeping up with the Joneses”. It makes use of the
assumption that agents compare their own consumption to the current rather than past average
consumption32. Although this type is used in a variety of applications, it features an unrealistic
high degree of shortsightedness. It is, in fact, implausible that envious agents do not remember
the recent consumption activities of their contemporaries. And if they do, why should they not
take them into account?
5 Conclusion and Extensions
In a novel synthesis this paper incorporates status preferences - modeled as relative consump-
tion - into a two-sector growth model in order to investigate the implications of an individual’s
32In contrast, the non-degenerate model in this paper is of the so-called ”Catching up with the Joneses” type
since it assumes that agents are backward looking.
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consumption jealousy on the economy’s equilibrium and transitional dynamics. First and fore-
most we find that the presented model possesses a unique interior equilibrium that features a
two-dimensional stable manifold. The properties of the associated balanced growth path depend
crucially on the structural parameters that govern the status motive. For empirically plausible
values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, we find that higher degrees of consumption
jealousy tend to ”push-up” human capital accumulation, hence, the economy’s aggregate growth
rate. This result is due to a phenomenon that we call the reallocation effect. More intensive
status seeking drives up the marginal utility of own consumption, which induces agents to shift
raw time to education in order to capitalize on the higher marginal utility in the future. We also
identify a second effect in this context - labeled as the marginal product effect - that tends to
reduce economic growth through a diminished steady-state marginal product of physical capital.
However, we show that for an intertemporal elasticity of substitution consistent with empirical
estimates the first effect always dominates the latter. The observed intersectoral allocation of
disposable time suggests an inverse relationship of the steady-state relative capital intensity to
the status motive. Hence, our model predicts that a society that values relative consumption
possesses a relatively higher human capital stock than a comparable economy with a weaker
status valuation. Moreover, we wish to emphasize that the calibrated benchmark economy fea-
tures steady state properties that are highly consistent with actual economies. This makes us
highly confident about its potential usefulness for further (probably empirical) research. One
of the primary goals of the paper is to study the transitional dynamics of the two-sector model
augmented with a time-dependent preferences structure. For this purpose we introduce two
different shocks - a productivity shock in the final goods sector and a preference shock - into
the model and analyze the resulting transitional behavior. A striking result we derive from
this exercise concerns the response of work effort to a positive productivity disturbance. If
agents’ consumption jealousy is more history-orientated in the sense that she cares about her
neighbors past (rather than recent) consumption, then labor supply in the final goods sector
initially declines, generating a seemingly counterfactual behavior. This result is, however, con-
sistent with the recent literature claiming that favorable productivity disturbances are likely
to cause short-run contractions in work effort. In our case this behavior is due to temporary
productivity imbalances across sectors, which motivates an initial shift of raw time toward edu-
cation. If the jealousy motive is, however, more present-orientated, then we get the reverse case,
which can be traced back to a phenomenon which we call the status effect. More specifically,
present-orientation causes rapid reference stock adjustment and, hence, temporarily pushes-up
consumption growth, which can be sustained only if labor moves to the consumption goods
sector. The case of a preference shock that is designed to mimic a shift to stronger and more
presence orientated consumption envy teaches us different lessons. An induced permanent shift
to education pushes the economy’s long-term growth rate and alters the steady-state relative
capital intensity in favor of human capital. The short-run response of the latter is, however,
characterized by an overshooting behavior. This results from an initial stimulus for physical cap-
ital investment that is due to a higher-than equilibrium average product of physical capital. As
the latter declines over time and approaches its long-run value, the physical capital growth rate
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falls short the human capital growth rate, resulting in a falling physical to human capital ratio.
Additionally, the overshooting gets more pronounced for more present-orientated jealousy. As
mentioned previously, rapid reference stock adjustment (caused by present-orientation) pushes
the marginal utility of own consumption which poses an additional incentive (given by a higher
shadow value) to invest in physical capital.
We believe this paper provides in general terms useful guidelines for studying the dynamics of
a status augmented two-sector model. Moreover, due to its relatively concise structure it allows
for several extensions. Introducing individuals’ heterogeneity (in, e.g. initial endowments or
status valuation), for instance would allow for discussing possible catching behavior that might
be relevant especially in an outward-looking environment. Empirical work by Featherman and
Stevens (1982) suggests a fundamental role of human capital in people’s status considerations.
In other words, it is relative human capital, instead of consumption (or wealth), determines indi-
viduals’ position in society. In a two-sector model this would imply different incentives for agents
to engage in education, which might alter the dynamic structure of the model. The presence of
externalities implies that there is clearly room for welfare improving policy interventions. The
discussion of various taxes and subsidies is, thus, also a worthwhile extension. In the context of
relative consumption, welfare is per se an interesting issue, since consumption jealousy implies
distorted individuals’ decisions with respect to factor accumulation and supply. Hence, growth
and welfare effects are expected to differ.
6 Appendix
6.1 Steady State Values
Setting the system in (16)-(19) equal to zero yields
ν∗ =
ϕ
α
(1− χ∗)ζ
[
1− α+ ζχ
∗
1− χ∗
]
+
(1− α)
α
(δ − η) (25)
ω∗ = 1 +
ϕ (1− χ∗)ζ − η
κ
(26)
ξ∗ =
[
1
αφ
[
ϕ (1− χ∗)ζ
[
1 +
ζχ∗
1− χ∗
]
+ δ − η
]]− 1
1−α
χ∗ (27)
ϕ (1− χ∗)ζ
[(
ζχ∗
1− χ∗
)
+ β (1− σ)
]
= ρ+ βη (1− σ) (28)
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